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Can Organisational Failures be Prevented Before They Occur? 
(A discussion about Corporate Governance and Risk Management) 
 





Given the recurrence of corporate and other organisational failures in recent years, one might 
wonder if both self-regulation within corporate and industrial settings and active government regulation is 
ineffective in an increasingly complex and changing modern world.  A question that might also be asked is 
how (and what) organisations and governments learn from such failures?  By extension it must be assumed 
that relevant aspects of what is learnt (or rediscovered) influences new policy or legislative change thus 
enhancing governance and further reducing the likelihood of future failure.  With the presumption that 
causal and conditional evidence about such failures always awaits discovery and that humans and human 
systems ‘learn,’ the viability of anticipating future failure is self-evident. 
 
Drawing on a number of conceptual traditions including Normal Accident Theory (why large 
complex organisational systems tend to fail), High Reliability Organisations (how some organisations 
minimise failure), and Crisis Prone Organisations, this paper argues that a capacity to anticipate failures 
and mitigate loss, is theoretically possible as a result of enhanced and directed professional practice in 
Corporate Governance and Risk Management.  The paper also argues that while such capacities are 
valuable and may be sought after, the processes required to deliver organisational learning may often 




The past three decades have provided a varied kaleidoscope of organisational crises and failures to 
whet the appetite of observers interested in the wellbeing of national and international economies and 
public and private institutions generally.  Incidents have ranged from large-scale corporate failures to 
policy-regulatory disasters with ongoing consequences to industries, global commerce and members of the 
public in many countries.  
 
Notable examples within this category include failure in regulatory oversight of Mad Cow Disease 
in the U.K. (and more broadly elsewhere in Europe), the demise of the Barings Bank and the managerial 
implosions of the Enron Corp. and WorldCom Inc. to name but a few.  Other examples might also be 
chosen from a range of industries and settings.     
 
Could such failures be the result of bad management, the impact of unforseen circumstances or 
just plain bad luck?  A viable consideration might also be that in the integrated post-modern world in which 
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we live, institutional competencies for dealing with the pre-conditions of emergent failure are not evolving 
as fast as the causes and co-factors of such failure.  An important issue related to this point is how (and 
what) organisations central to such failures learn from their experience.  It might be assumed that lessons 
learnt from direct or indirect participation in organisational loss would rapidly influence changes of policy 
and practice and be implemented with haste.   
 
Questions of critical importance to both the public and private sector relate to whether the learning 
derived from participation in such failures can actually reduce the likelihood of future failure or at least 
attenuate consequent impacts.  With the presumption that causal and conditional evidence about such 
failures always awaits discovery and that, humans and human systems do ‘learn’ from such events, the 
viability of anticipating future failure is self-evident.  While such practices seem part of ‘good business’ it 
has been suggested that in the longer term, as operating circumstances change, organisations must also un-
learn established practices (retain a capacity to adapt) in order to survive (Nystrom & Starbuck, 1984:53).                                      
 
Establishing such an evolutionary capacity in organisations, however, requires more than the 
presence of strong and well-resourced internal control mechanisms derived from integrated corporate 
governance and risk management processes.  The achievement of the dual outcome of learning and 
responsive control requires an openness and sensitivity to organisational vulnerability and adjustments to 
entrained ideas and practices that are likely to be outside prevailing corporate - managerial ‘comfort zones.’  
While transparency is a well-known aspect of corporate governance, a regular comprehensive assessment 
of organisational vulnerability may not be.  
 
This paper discusses the idea of anticipating the emergence of failure, or its pre-conditions, in 
organisational and regulatory settings.  Initially, it outlines the nature of a range of organisational failures 
that have emerged from the complexity of a modern, networked world.  These events are then examined in 
reference to empirically grounded explanatory frameworks such as Normal Accident Theory (why large 
complex organisational systems tend to fail), High Reliability Organisation Theory (how certain types of 
organisations minimise failure) and the notion of crisis prone organisations (cultural predispositions for 
failure).  From this examination the paper suggests that a generic capacity to anticipate organisational 
failures, and thus mitigate loss, is theoretically and practically possible and presents an operational 
framework for structuring this capacity derived from the convergence of the practice of corporate 
governance and risk management. 
 
 
Organisational Failure: The more things change … 
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Failure in human activity systems, such as businesses, governament regulatory systems, or in the 
provision of essential services, is not an unfamiliar event in the modern world.  Some commentators 
suggest that such ‘disturbances’ are increasing in complexity and in consequence (Lagadec & Michel-
Kerjan, 2004).  After detailed causal analysis, incidents that on the surface seem purely technical failures 
often exhibit causal factors from deeper complex social and cultural contexts.   
 
History provides an extensive retrospective of both recent and more distant organisational failures 
and disasters.  Some incidents, such as the Tay Bridge collapse on the evening of 28 December 1879 during 
a severe westerly gale, have been shown to involve economic issues in addition to elements of incomplete 
engineering design and construction.  A number of aspects of mid-Victorian industrialisation have been 
suggested as major contributors of the bridge collapse: a bridge building frenzy, linked to the progressive 
and rapid expansion of railway construction, as well as commercial competition (Pinsdorf, 1997).  Key 
causal factors in this collapse and subsequent loss of life were determined to be a combination of unsafe 
and unsound design as well as substandard construction materials and on-the-job quality control (Pinsdorf, 
1997).  Mileham (1998), more bluntly, suggests that the bridge was built with only two things in mind - 
speed of construction and cost.   
The Tay Bridge collapse emerged from a convergence of the socio-economic and technological 
advances of the time.  Further, while it is an important landmark in respect to changing the way bridges 
were designed and constructed (Lewis & Reynolds, 2002), the collapse remains relatively uncomplicated in 
comparison to the breadth and depth of consequences from recent large-scale crises.  Turner (1994) carried 
out analyses of major technical accidents over an extended period and reached a conclusion that 
approximately 20 to 30% of the causes of accidents sampled were technical in nature with 70 to 80% 
involving social, administrative or managerial factors.  Social, administrative or managerial solutions were 
identified as highly represented in the mix of solutions defined post-incident.  Given that the nature of most 
organisations entail humans and technology embedded together, it is logical to think of organisational 
failures in both the private and public sectors as elements within this broader class of socio-technical crisis.   
 
Emergent phenomena such as climate change, public and animal health crises, the increasing 
hyper-complexity of embedded information-communications-technology (ICT), and the threat of terrorism 
can be subsumed under this category.  Instances of failure from such sources are likely to generate 
cascading impacts through unexpected pathways and fault lines throughout the private and public sectors.  
Because of these cascading phenomena, institutions would be unlikely to face single incidents but rather 
systemic failures appearing concurrently: a network effect.  A further point to note is that both natural and 
technological hazards can impact directly on human systems as well as being propagated by them.  An 
obvious example of this propagation is the transmission of Sudden-Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) 
internationally via business and tourist air travel.      
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Interestingly, commentators in the early 1990’s suggested that many organisational crises may 
replicate in a number of common ways, yet never manifesting in exactly the same manner (Anderson, 
1991).  The suggestion that there are repeatable and recognisable stages in major socio-technical failure is 
compelling and is supported by a substantial literature grounded in the analysis of industrial and 
organisational settings over a number of years.   Stead & Smallman (1999)1 summarise key findings from a 
selection of this literature that identify five key stages in organisational failure.  This are:   
 
° Pre-conditions (sets of operational activity where ‘signs’ were buried or ignored in background noise); 
° Trigger (an escalation factor either internal or external to an organsation or setting); 
° Crisis (an emergent process exhibiting uncertainty and potential for loss and/disruption); 
° Recovery (systems recovery and normalisation of functions); 
° Learning (identification and changes to functional capacities of organisation/systems). 
 
Table 1 presents aspects of each failure stage in respect to the collapse of the Barings Bank and the 
Bank of Credit & Commerce International.  While differences exist between the two cases, there are a 
number of common aspects.  The triggers for both organisational failures were diverse: one seemingly 
because of fraud investigations, audit reports (as well as anonymous whistle blowing) and the other, a 
dramatic slump in the Japanese stock market because of the Kobe earthquake.  As a result of this slump, the 
Baring’s financial exposures could not be mitigated.   
 
Critical incidents (or multiple concurrent incidents) may be triggered at any time in large highly 
complex systems.  Such incidents might manifest suddenly and unexpectedly or may ‘cook’ slowly 
(without recognition) until some triggering event or process precipitates them.  In either case incidents can 
be surprising and/or unexpected.  The wider literature on complex systems failure suggests that for many 
situations evidence is discoverable that confirms there had been ‘signs’ that a crisis was emerging from 
organisational ‘noise’ (Perrow, 1984; Turner & Pidgeon 1997; Boin & Lagadec, 2000; Comfort et. al., 
2001, Rijpma, 1997).   
 
So if such causal factors interact within dysfunctional organisational elements repetitively, they 
might form a type of vulnerability fractal2 manifesting as a pattern of circumstances generated by the ways 
in which people deal and interact with the social and technical environments in which they live and work.   
Support for this notion is found in the cybernetic research of Beer (1966) who suggested that while it is 
impossible to predict events per se, the pattern of interaction between systemic components is predictable. 
 
                                                          
1 Key works are: Turner, (1978), Turner & Pidgeon, (1997), Smith, (1990), Pearson & Mitroff, (1993) and Pearson & Clair (1998).   
2 The term fractal as coined by Mandelbrot originally referred to shapes that are "self-similar" that is - looked the same at different 
magnifications.  My meaning here is more metaphorical but is intended to convey that certain causal and explanatory factors, 
identified retrospectively, seem to have common bases and recur to a consistent degree 
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Table 1: Stages of Organisational Failure: Barings Bank and The Bank of Credit & Commerce International   
                (Derived from Stead and Smallman, 1999) 
 
 Barings Bank The Bank of Credit & Commerce 
International 
° Ill-defined and complicated Corporate 
Structure (Confused reporting lines & 
accountabilities) 
° Few staff experienced at futures trading 
° Unregulated & growing market 
° Senior management seemed unaware of the 
potential for loss from financial activities  
° Complicated organsiational structure 
° Unprecedented growth in global banking  





° Communication gaps among regulators 
° Un-prepared for crisis situation 
° Failure by auditors to detect unusual transactions 
° Inadequate monitoring by senior authority 
° External parties aware of some degree of irregularity 
Trigger ° The ‘plunge’ of the Japanese stock market 
following the Kobe earthquake  
° A report by Price Waterhouse Coopers 
° An anonymous tip-off 
° Action by the New York Attorney General  
° Focused on futures trading and individual 
fraud 
° Losses of approximately USD$15 billion 
° Bogus loans & external funds - predominately 
multi-individual fraud  
° Losses in excess of USD$927 million 
Crisis 
Common Issues: 
° Severe impacts on the financial industry and the economy  
° Extensive media coverage 
Recovery ° Barings purchased by ING ° BCCI ceased trading 
Learning Common Issues: 
° Management had little opportunity to learn due to BCCI’s closure and Barings being absorbed by 
another organisation. 
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Ringland et.al. (1999) noted a number of cultural factors prevalent in organizations, indicating a 
generic inability to anticipate future conditions. These are ‘not paying attention;’ ‘losing messages amongst 
internal noise;’ ‘overconfidence in expertise;’ and ‘assumptions of adequacy.’   The latter two of this list 
might have been pertinent in the Barings Bank collapse especially in terms of the activities of key 
personnel described as ‘not sufficiently experienced to realise the potential dangers’ of their actions (Stead 
& Smallman, 1999).    The reality of complex networked systems, as evidenced by the growth of the 
internet and the world-wide-web, has enabled the ubiquity of e-commerce and other evolving forms of 
virtual communication as mainstays of the modern world.   
 
The efficacy of ‘networked” systems as both a descriptive and analytical tool within international 
business settings, especially in logistics and supply-chain management, has great credence.  This is 
particularly pertinent given that there are an estimated 250 million maritime cargo movements each year 
(circa 2003) and that up to 90% of world cargo movement occurring in shipping containers (OECD, 2003).   
The size and complexity of the logistics systems that underpin these numbers staggers imagination.   
 
Mahon & Cochran (1991) have suggested that the use of aspects of complexity theory as a 
conceptual and analytical tool within commerce, organisational design and functioning would become a 
paramount factor in effective corporate and operational management in the public and private sectors 
globally.  More recently, Robertson (2004) has supported this contention.  While the application of these 
concepts seem both reasonable and logical, implementing processes to accommodate such an extension is 
likely to generate much activity for consultants - both internal and external to firms.   
 
The return-on-investment from such activities however may not be easily delivered.  While 
complexity theory is rich in examples within ecological and natural systems, it would be critical to have 
empirical basis for analytical frames grounded in organisational functioning, and in this case dys-
functioning.   Without these bases to guide understanding of how organisations and institutions operate as 
they fail, or edge towards failure, remedial management options would remain limited. 
 
Crisis management theorists have emphasised the need for strategists to extend their traditional 
conceptual frames and stakeholder maps from models of the world as a simple machine to the world as a 
complex system (Mitroff & Kilmann, 1984).  The drawing of analogies between biological systems and 
socio-technical systems, while once not a part of mainstream management science, has been validated or at 
least accepted by many thought leaders and trans-disciplinary researchers (Holling, 2001).  In this sense, 
circumstances under which expected organisational functioning ‘transitions’ from normality to crisis, may 
be an analogue of moving from regularity (familiar - expected functioning) to the edge of chaos 
(unmanageable complexity).       
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Ways of Seeing: analytical frameworks 
 
Given the complex factors in organisational failures and the tendency for such events to 
‘fractalise,’ access to workable conceptual and explanatory frameworks for policy development and risk 
management processes are critical.  An operational understanding of the emergence of crises into ‘normal’ 
everyday life (and organisations) requires individuals and groups to ‘make sense’ what is occurring to 
them, and around them.   
 
Recognition of the generic stages of a crisis is important but such external categorisation does not 
necessarily allow a conceptual understanding of the causes of a crisis.  A number of pivotal conceptual 
schemas, specifically related to organisational failure and crisis mitigation and derived from empirical 
evidence from both post-failure analysis and functional organisations, are available in the literature.  Three 
framework-themes are examined to establish a basis for developing a deeper understanding of 
organisational failure: Normal Accident Theory; High Reliability Organisations and Crisis Prone 
Organisations.      
 
Normal Accident Theory 
Normal Accident Theory (NAT) emerged from analysis of a range of industrial disasters and 
accidents spanning a period of at least the last 40 years.  Such incidents include the chemical release at the 
Union Carbide plant at Bhopal (India), the 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant and 
many others.  Perrow (1984) introduced the idea that in some technological systems, accidents are 
inevitable or ‘normal.’  He defined two related dimensions - interactive complexity and loose/tight coupling 
- that defined organisational susceptibility to accidents (Marais et. al., 2004).   
 
The notion of interactive complexity includes two factors: Linear and complex interactions.  
Linear interactions are elements in expected or planned operational sequences.  The attributes of linear 
systems generally behave in planned ways with single functions.  Interactive complexities, however, derive 
from unfamiliar, unplanned or unique operational sequences that might not be visible or comprehensible to 
users of the system (Perrow, 1984).  Table 2 displays generic differences between complex and linear 
systems.  
 
The critical aspect this dyad is comprehensibility: with linear interaction deemed more easily 
understood than complex interactive phenomena.   This does not mean linear equates to ‘simple’ as many 
very complicated systems do not exhibit strong interactive complexity.  Perrow (1984) suggested that linear 
systems exhibited fewer feedback loops than found within non-linear systems.  The potential for interactive 
complexity emerges from the likelihood of unfamiliar and/or unexpected sequences of events linked to 
feedback processes.   











The second explanatory dimension; ‘coupling’ is defined as the degree of slack or redundancy 
between system components.  Organizations with loose coupling for example may have flexible 
performance standards with less time-dependencies and a capacity for ‘last-minute’ resource and process 
substitution.  Tightly coupled systems on the contrary possess elements whose functions are highly 
interdependent with other sub-systems, and linked relationally in space and/or time.  Therefore, a change in 
one part can rapidly affect the status of other parts.  Table 3 details tendencies of both forms of coupling. 
 
Table 3: Characteristics of Tight and Loose Coupling (Perrow, 1984) 
Tight Coupling Loose Coupling 
° Processing delays not possible 
° Non-varying sequences 
° Single methods used 
° Little ‘slack’ possible in 
supplies, personnel or equipment 
° Buffers & redundancies are 
deliberate and designed in 
° Processing delays are possible 
° Sequence order can be changed 
° Multiple methods are available 
° Slack in resources possible 
 
° Buffers and redundancies 
available are applied as needed 
  
Perturbations in tightly coupled systems can show an effect quickly, often with serious and 
disastrous consequences.  NAT defines loosely coupled or decoupled systems as having fewer or less 
‘critical’ links between parts and therefore able to absorb failures or unplanned behaviour without 
significant destabilisation.   
 
According to theory, systems with interactive complexity and tight coupling have increased 
potential to experience accidents that cannot be foreseen or prevented.  Perrow (1984) refers to these as 
‘system’ accidents.  When the system is interactively complex, inter-dependent failure events can interact 
Table 2: Characteristics of Complex and Linear Systems (Perrow, 1984) 
Complex Systems Linear Systems 
° Components closely packed  
° Non-varying sequences 
° Interconnected sub-systems  
° Many feedback loops 
° Multiple / interacting controls  
° Indirect information 
° Components spatially segregated 
° Sequence order can be changed 
° Segregated sub-systems 
° Few feedback loops 
° Segregated controls 
° Direct Information  
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in ways that cannot be predicted by the designers and operators of the system.  If the system is also tightly 
coupled, the cascading of effects can quickly spiral out of control before operators are able to understand 
the situation and perform appropriate corrective actions.  The loss of control was a strong possibility during 
the Three Mile Island nuclear reactor Incident.  In such systems, apparently trivial incident can cascade in 
unpredictable way and with possibly severe consequences (Marais et. al., 2004).   
 
Systems accidents result form a gestalt of the processes not the component parts themselves.  The 
practical importance of NAT is that it allows observers to comprehend the interaction and flow of events in 
difficult and ambiguous situations as organisations deal with unexpected events.  The explanatory power of 
the ‘linear and interactively complex systems’ terminology, central to NAT, was a key reason it was 
included in the language used by the investigating Commission to describe the Columbia shuttle disaster 
(Weick, 2004).  A further element of value is that NAT focuses on structural factors and combinations of 
problems instead of on isolated errors of individual human operators or design flaws in individual 
components. This focus allows scrutiny of the structural underpinnings of organisational systems and the 
often intricate and unexpected causes of system failure (Jermier, 2004).  
 
High Reliability Organisations  
High Reliability Organisations (HRO’s), as the words suggest, are closely linked to safety, 
regularity and accuracy.  Roberts (1990) suggests that if the answer to the question ‘how many times could 
this organization have failed resulting in catastrophic consequences but did not’ is in the order of tens of 
thousands of times, then that organisation exhibits ‘high ’reliability.       
 
To achieve this HRO’s operate in a context of near full knowledge of the physical and technical 
aspects of the operational activities they carry out.  People in these organisations know almost everything 
technical about what they are doing and aim at having prepared for nearly every conceivable contingency.  
Aircraft carriers within the US Navy have been a major empirical source of data about HRO theory 
development (Roberts, 1990a; Roberts1990b; Roberts, Rouseau & La Porte, 1994).    
 
This drive for predictability in HRO’s and candidate HRO’s has resulted in the adoption of 
relatively stable technical processes that are well understood by participants.   The ‘deep’ safety - reliability 
aspects of an existing work culture is imbued into new workers from their first day.   Beyond this 
socialisation process, a higher goal of functional systems is that interactive complexity is designed-out of 
processes to the greatest possible extent.  A further factor is that task specifications and functional designs 
are unchanging, or very slowly changing, and that maximal learning is sought after accidents and incidents 
(Marais et. al., 2004). 
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The tendency to seek and require complete knowledge of a system or process by HRO’s contrasts 
against the ‘interactive complexity,’ described by NAT where the interactions between components cannot 
be thoroughly planned, understood, predicted, or guarded against.  Ideally for HRO’s, it would be relatively 
easy to lower risk through standard system safety and industrial safety approaches.  Unfortunately most 
complex systems, particularly high technology and social systems, do not fall into this category (Marais et. 
al., 2004).  
       
Crisis Prone Organisations 
Henry Kissinger is reputed to have once said that .. “I don’t have time for a crisis next week my 
schedule is already full.”  While the humour of such a statement is obvious evidence derived from the crisis 
management literature would suggest that many organizations possess a range of vulnerabilities that, in 
effect, predispose them to failure often without self-awareness or recognition of existing susceptibility. 
 
Analyses of iconic organisational failures and their aftermath have shown that in addition to 
certain causal triggers of crises being unexpected and predisposing factors overlooked (as evidenced in 
Table 1), the capacity to respond quickly and appropriately once emergent signs appeared also seemed 
restricted.  Specific organisational cultural patterns or ‘operating rules’ have been retrospectively linked to 
the genesis and amplification of well-known organisational crises.  It has been strongly argued that the 
presence of such patterns in an operational repertoire increase vulnerability and the likelihood of accidents 
and crises (Perrow, 1984).  Of the many that have been examined three pertinent examples are noted here.  
These are: 
 
° Rigidity in thinking: Restricted expectation about contingencies and their consequences, inflexibility in 
considering alternative options & choices for mitigation; 
° Information Distortion: Attenuation and filtering of information to key decision makers; 
° Lack of Decision Readiness: Key decision makers not practiced in emergency decision making.  
 (Smart & Vertinsky, 1977) 
  
The explosion of the Challenger space shuttle exemplifies bureaucratic attenuation of information 
flow and rigid viewpoints. A number of investigations after the incident called attention to the fact that 
people within engineering areas of the launch group repeatedly expressed concern, sometimes quite 
forcibly, about the potential dangers of launching the Challenger under low-temperature conditions.  It is 
interesting to note that persons at the top of the organisation reported never having heard anything about 
such concerns during the same investigations (Freudenburg, 1992). 
 
Information filtering can lead to a reduced organisational capacity to make operationally difficult 
decisions.  Further, over time, attenuation of information especially if it relates to the functioning core of 
sub-systems can lead to organisational blindness.  Patterns such as these that support the ‘incubation’ of 
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failures and the inability to note the presence of ‘warning signs’ are symptoms of crisis prone organisations 
(Turner & Pidgeon 1997; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993; Mitroff & Alpaslan, 2003).  Crises and their 
consequences might also be seen as caused not just from the failure to notice signs, but also from a failure 
of organisational systems to respond to them.   
 
The Exxon Valdez oil disaster exhibits aspects of all three of these cultural phenomena.  While 
shipping in and out of the Alyeska pipeline terminal in Valdez (Alaska) had not been totally free of 
incidents, the generally safe pattern of experience up to mid-night on March 23rd 1989 is unlikely to have 
raised concerns about catastrophic failure for most observers.  Over a period of more than a decade up to 
the incident, approximately 8,000 tankers had gone in and out of the port without a single catastrophic 
failure.  Five minutes later, however, a sophisticated oil tanker that was literally miles away from its 
original plotted course had an incredibly stupid encounter with a submerged obstacle (Freudenburg, 1992).  
 
Past success (or lack of failure) can inculcate restrictive beliefs about what might happen in the 
future and generate assumptions about reduced vulnerabilities for individual actors and organisations.  A 
further set of unrealistic expectations about contingencies and capacity to respond were embodied in extant 
emergency plans for Prince William Sound and the surrounding terminal infrastructure.  A number of 
contingency plans were in effect at the time of the spill (Clarke, 1989).  These included: 
 
° The National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 
° The Coast Guard’s Captain of the Port Prince William Sound Pollution Action Plan, 
° The Alaska Regional Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan 
° The State of Alaska’s Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 
° The Alyeska Pipeline Service Company’s Oil Spill Contingency Plan for Prince William Sound. 
 
General expectations embodied in these plans assumed that rescue and response equipment would 
be at the ready and that this material would be deployed in a carefully coordinated manner, with an efficient 
and effective division of labour among organisations being instituted almost immediately.  A further 
expectation was that clear, open and honest communication channels would be established readily among 
previously competitive or even adversarial organizations and that each responding organisation would take 
precisely the right step at precisely the right time to fit the need of other organizations (Freudenburg, 1992). 
 
The reality was that confusion seems to have been far more commonplace than communication.  
Rather than coordinating their activities the various organizations with a stake in the spill and the clean-up 
often seemed to have more interest in blaming one another than in working together (Freudenburg, 1992). 
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Lack of decision readiness and unrealistic assumptions about roles and actions to be carried out by 
relevant actors can lead to a state of operational gridlock.  The contingency planning in place at Prince 
William Sound has been described as reflecting organizational perceptions regarding possible catastrophes 
and their nature, and belief that the likelihood of oil spills had been thoroughly considered.  Such plans 
were intended to convey that the organisations were in control of a potentially uncontrollable situation 
(Clarke,1993).  When informed of the incident with the Exxon Valdez U.S. Coast Guard Vice-Admiral 
Clyde E. Robins is reported to have said this was impossible as we have the perfect preventive and 
contingency system (italics added) (Egan, 1989).3 
 
The Surprise Factor: Learning, Un-learning or just forgetting? 
 
Surprise has always had an egalitarian affect in society.  To be pleasantly surprised is more 
preferable than the alternative.  The alternative state unfortunately has, as shown above, been present more 
often than not in many organisational crises.  The absence of surprise within organisational operations 
could be an important sign that regulatory control systems operate as expected and are in place to deal with 
functional requirements of normal operations.        
 
There are many instances where failures are so significant that permanent changes occur in 
complete bodies of knowledge and professional practice.  The Tay Bridge disaster, as mentioned earlier, 
instigated important changes in bridge design, construction and inspection (Lewis & Reynolds, 2002).  
Equally, failure can also instigate wholesale changes in institutions both public and private.  Examples from 
the corporate world such as Enron and WorldCom have influenced the introduction significant new 
legislative regulations for financial reporting and governance generally.   The Sarbannes-Oxley Act in the 
U.S. and the Corporate law Economic Reform Program (CLERP 9) in Australia, both introduced in 2002, 
are examples of the regulatory reactions (learning) to recent corporate failure.   
 
Equally, the public sector has not escaped post-failure change.  In the U.K the changes made to the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fibre (MAFF) in the wake of the Bovine Spongiform Encephalitis (BSE) 
crisis are a point in fact.  Almost instantly within the normally slow bureaucratic time space, MAFF 
became the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA).  This re-badging, in marketing 
terms, might be construed as an enforced ‘un-learning’ to adapt to external pressures from concern about 
the management of the BSE crisis, not only by the public but also from a political perspective.                     
 
An important factor in most aspects of crisis management is, of course, decision making.  Usually 
this will be carried out under considerable stress (due to time sensitivity and the importance of ‘getting-it-
                                                          
3 Reported by Clarke (1993). 
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right’) and uncertainty (including confusion and ignorance).  In generally well-known socio-technological 
settings (as in HRO’s) the uncertainty may be less a factor for decision makers    
 
The role of government in preventing such failures is critical in that varieties of the ‘modern state’ 
as functional providers of public administration and governance derive validity from the promise that it is 
an effective (and preferred) form for the provision of safety (and certainty) in society.  This role is made 
more important because in representative democracies, it is a reality that many decisions with potential to 
affect our lives are made by others.  Such power differentials can manifest as intractable concerns among 
members of the public who find themselves distant from the decision-making processes (Luhmann, 1990).  
 
Of equal importance are questions about the role of the private sector in generating and promoting 
new technologies and sustaining established ones, especially within the mélange of supply, demand and 
consumption.  In addition to a diverse literature recognising issues of public trust and perceptions of the 
credibility of institutions there has been a recent expansion of policy development and enhanced 
professional dialogue in Europe and elsewhere focusing on the implementation of governance frameworks 
that are inclusive of the needs of a range of stakeholders.4   
 
Beyond questions of public confidence in regulatory authority a further issue for government is 
the regulation of science and the support of economic activity.  It is common for modern government(s) to 
actively support and promote innovation for the betterment of society.  An ongoing task for government as 
it endeavors to support such development is how to bring the management of scientific innovation and the 
promotion of technology into the public arena and thus into a mainstream democratic discourse (Giddens, 
2001).  
   
An extension of the notion that government ‘makes safe’ is the expectation that it also licenses and 
regulates the use of technology, and by doing so, provides a degree of certainty about predictability and 
safety of it’s use.  It is here that risk management and technological foresight are critical: especially as it 
applies to regulatory organizations.  This especially holds in relation to reducing the likelihood that 
incidents or issues involving the impact of technology or regulatory safety develop into crises.        
 
Paradigmatic science, in a Kuhnian sense, and its cousin standardized technology, is expected to 
be relatively surprise free.  Unexpected impacts from the application of technology can and do occur often 
with higher order consequences that extend over dispersed geography often with inter-generational impacts.  
Figure 1 explores this issue in greater detail.   
 
                                                          
4 The TRUSTNET Framework (A New Perspective on Risk Governance) circa 1999, and more recently “Trustnet-in-
Action.” 
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A suitable goal of effective public and private oversite of technology might be to minimise 
generation of outcomes as shown in segment 3 and 4, while promoting policies that seek to support 
achieving the relatively benign state in segments 1 and 2.  The emergence of segment 3 or 4 impacts may 
be difficult to predict because of unnoticed trends, an unanticipated synergism between components of 
complex systems5 or by a discontinuity (an abrupt shift in a previously stable system or context).6  From an 
NAT perspective emergent impacts such as those in segment 4 cause surprises because they manifest from 




















Marais et. al. (2004) suggests that organisations such as NASA or any that develop and/or use 
advanced technology, across a range of disciplines, do not always have detailed experience from which to 
form the basis of familiarity and “learning.”  Experience with old technologies might not be applicable to 
newer ones.  For example, digital systems such as fly-by-wire avionics or transnational information and 
communication technology systems may in fact affect the frequency, nature and understandability of 
accidents.    
 
                                                          
5 Examples of Segment 4 impacts: The discovery of BSE in cattle related to the use of meat and bone meal products in 
feed and the admission that zoonotic transmission was likely to be a major causal factor (if not the cause) of a 
significant increase in cases of new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.     
6 Over use of a natural resource either by grazing or over fishing could affect the reproductive success of some flora or 
fauna to the point where the sustainability of that resource is significantly disturbed and it is forced into a rapid and 
irreversible decline. 
Figure 1: Limited and Dispersed Impact of a Technology 
    (Barnes & Hulsman, 1995)  
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Marais et. al. (2004) further suggest that advanced technical systems might change the type of 
errors made by operators and that experience with older, electro-mechanical systems have little 
evolutionary link to new system designs and technology.  It is from this type of context that normal 
accidents and techno-contextual surprise emerge. 
 
If such incomprehensibility factors are combined with an organisational culture that is crisis prone 
with heritable characteristics such as, rigidity of core beliefs, values and assumptions of competency, 
ineffective communication and information sharing capacities, and a misplaced belief in of its own 
expertise, the organisation may be incapable of learning and in generating flexible responses (Smith, 1999).  
Referring again to recent snapshots of organisational culture in NASA, Mason (2004) suggests that the 
causal context of a failure may reach a considerable distance back in organisational history.  The agency’s 
long string of previous successes, however, may have led its managers to believe that they could do no 
wrong. This attitude of omnipotence is very dangerous when dealing with complex, unruly, ultimately 
unpredictable technology (Mason, 2004). 
 
An important issue in the modern world of e-commerce and interoperability is the potential for 
unexpected convergence of crisis elements to impact on human systems and generate effect propagation via 
the inter-connectedness of these same systems.  Lagadec & Michel-Kerjan (2004) refer to such a tendency 
to ubiquitousness as a ‘Network’ factor.  By escalating the notion of a normal accident to consider global 
interdependencies and globally tight couplings we might have seen in recent events, real-time 
discontinuities that create situations where an understanding of the settings and contexts of crises eases 
beyond the grasp of competent authorities to make sense of the trajectory of events.  Crises such as these 
are often described as ‘outside of the box,’ ‘too fast,’ ‘too strange’ and ‘too costly’ (Lagadec, 2004).  It is in 
such circumstances that preventing critical network events and the surprise they bring is critical.  
 
Decision making, and even providing reasoned advice, is extremely difficult in circumstances 
where organisations are surprised by internal or externally sourced failure.  Given the convergence of 
information, actors and factors within crisis situations a critical question is how officials make sense of the 
complexity surrounding them and how such developed awareness influences decision making (Weick, 
1988). 
 
Learning is also a form sense making which, in retrospect, illuminates how decisions were and 
were not made.  The reaction of Winston Churchill after the fall of Singapore in WWII is an interesting 
consideration.  Allison (1993) notes that he asked four questions in his role as leader: “why didn’t I Know,” 
“why wasn’t I told,” “why didn’t I ask,” “why didn’t I tell what I knew?”     
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By logic, no one person could ask these questions and by extension, it would take organisational 
knowledge to answer them.   It may be that organisational learning starts with ensuring the presence of 
internal capacities to ask such questions in advance of being surprised and then determining if 
organisational policies and functional systems support the effective and timely delivery of the answers.        
 
Anticipation: A Convergence of Corporate Governance and Risk Management   
 
A key factor in the literature and professional practice of crisis and disaster prevention is early 
warning and effective communication (Wisenblit, 1989).  As suggested earlier, faulty or untimely 
communication is implicated in many well-known organisational crises.  The failure to notice signs in the 
pre-condition phase of a failure process may not just be the result of inattention but a compound issue of 
both deficiencies in the communication mechanisms and differences in functional worldviews between 
layers of an organisational hierarchy.   
 
Weir (2004)7 states that timely communication can be filtered out because ‘upper layers’ of 
management may find the content inappropriate or unacceptable.  Analysis of events leading to the loss of 
the space shuttle Columbia indicate that NASA officials initially rejected the foam strike as the proximate 
cause of the accident and as a matter of faith held steadfastly to that belief, even in the face of accumulating 
evidence and strong interventions of in-house engineers.  It is reported that such rigidity in belief was held 
by some members of the managing hierarchy that requests to gather more evidence via satellite or 
telescopic imagery were denied (Mason, 2004).    
 
Such unwillingness to listen to advice, especially when signals of emergent failure were present is 
at odds with historical practice in an earlier incarnation of NASA under the directorship of Werner von 
Braun.  von Braun used a communications practice referred to as ‘Monday Notes’ to elicit direct and timely 
feedback to and from mid-level project managers about problems or issues that arose in the previous week.  
von Braun personally made notes and put suggestions on the single page reports.  All ‘notes’ were copied 
and returned to the full management cohort.  As a result, upward and horizontal communication was 
enhanced (Tompkins, 1993).  Such orchestrated transparency would be unique even today.   
 
Lagadec and Michel-Kerjan, (2004) suggest that high-level executives may feel deeply threatened by the 
thought of promoting unpopular advice or views on emerging threats.  In such instances it could be 
common to treat such threats as ‘unrealistic’, ‘too rare’, ‘beyond our responsibility,’ quoting a lack of 
historical data and difficulty in measuring the emerging threats in metrics with which they and their board 
were familiar.  
 
                                                          
7 Referencing:  Beer (1966) & Revans (1982).  
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Corporate governance is grounded in the effective use of information management and control 
mechanisms (Turnbull, 2002:261).  An adequate capacity for corporate governance therefore would require 
the existence of a variety of channels of information to senior decision makers.  However most people with 
experience of working within either the public or private sector would appreciate that because the 
generation of information is a human-centred process, like the application power, communication channels 
are invariably clogged with bias, distortion and ‘noise.  Advice about overcoming this arteriosclerosis of 
information flow by creating multiple sources of information (formal and informal) and mechanisms for 
propagating it, spans a range of literature over a number of years (Shannon, 1949; Beer, 1995). 
 
The importance of systems complexity in explaining organisational failure has been noted 
extensively above.  Effective corporate governance also requires capacities for coping with this 
phenomenon and structuring suitable internal control mechanisms.  With suitable reporting mechanisms in 
place, enhanced variety in strategic information creation can be developed to generate increased capacity to 
attenuate corporate risk.   
 
The recognition of managerial structures, in circumstances of complexity, is supported 
conceptually by the ‘Law of Requisite Variety’ (Ashby, 1986).  Clearly stated, this aphorism suggests that 
the variety of a regulator (or control system) must equal that of the variety of the situation being regulated.  
Thus as organisations increase in complexity and opaqueness, so too must the sophistication and variety of 
acquisition of corporate information and regulatory control.      
 
While sophistication of the information in such circumstances is a given, it must be timely, be 
couched in forms that aid decision making and not impede it.  Additionally, there is no causal link between 
extra information and better decisions.  In fact too much information or an influx of new data can detract 
from balanced decision making.  Full awareness of these issues is central to creating useable knowledge as 
a decision support aid in uncertain contexts (Sarewitz & Pielke Jr., 2001).     
 
How could a convergent Corporate Governance - Risk Management framework that caters for 
these information issues be structured?  Figure 2 displays a possible operational structure designed to both 
minimise the emergence of the signs and symptoms of organsiational failure and identify them should they 
appear.  It has been in use within a large public sector organisation in Australia for some time.  The agency 
in question has the same general regulatory responsibilities as the UK Department of Environment, 
Forestry & Rural Affairs but covers a State with a jurisdiction many times that of the United Kingdom.        
 
The framework comprises a standard internal control capacity embodied in an Internal Audit 
committee with an expanded governance capacity in the form of separate Legislative and Finance 
committees.  It also includes a separate Corporate Risk Management Committee (CRMC).  All four 
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committees report in parallel to the Departmental Board of Governance.  The Legislative Committee 
provides advice on legislative reform related to departmentally regulated matters and external legislation.  
The Finance Committee, as might be expected, ensures accurate and detailed reporting of financial 
statements to the Board.  
 
The CRMC provides a department-wide forum for the promotion of risk management principles 
and techniques, and its members contribute to the management, direction and planning of risk management 
projects and tasks within the department.  It comprises representatives from the other three committees and 
includes risk management specialists.  The committee also acts as a filter for threat and risk issues cutting 
across the legislative or professional responsibilities of the other committees.  For example, a legislative 
development external to the organisation that had obvious impacts on policy implementation could have 
impacts on projected budgets.  A more complete picture of these issues is then aggregated by the CRMC 
into a combined assessment of departmental exposure.      
 
An eclectic view on the combined exposures would allow comprehensive and robust 
organisational mitigation strategies to be chosen and implemented.  A key function related to this strategic 
view is the preparation of a Corporate Threat Register.   
 
The Corporate Threat Register (CTR) is used a decision-making aid by the Board of Governance 
to prioritise risk management activities, decision making and enhance governance generally.  
 
The purpose of the CTR is to provide the means to: 
° Support a process to identify key issues that may emerge as a crisis and determine prevention and/or 
mitigation strategies; 
° Accommodate multiple technical and professional perspective’s on risk and loss and differing 
regulatory needs across a diverse public sector portfolio; 
° Produce consistent and rigorous risk analyses to support decision-making functions of the Board of 
































Design specifications for the register include the functionality for identifying and documenting:   
° Strategic threats that could affect the standing of the Department and/or reduce the likelihood of 
achieving strategic goals and objectives; 
° Information about identified threats and recommended mitigation strategies for decision makers;  
° Threat-related information in a form that supported effective decision making and was derived from a 
robust and standardised risk analysis methodology; 
° Mitigation strategies and accompanied implementation plans across the organisation; 
° Individuals or groups responsible for implementing mitigation strategies (Barnes, 2001).  
 
A higher order purpose of the Corporate Risk Management Framework shown in Figure 2 is to 
overcome any propensity of the department to become crisis prone and succumb to the many interactive 
complexity and coupling factors present in such a large and diverse public organisation.  By engaging in a 
structured analytical process the benefits of strategic foresight, issue and scenario analysis and the 
engagement of expertise at all levels of the organisation, a capacity to recognise unexpected and usual 
Figure 2:  A Corporate Risk Management Framework 
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Members Members Members 
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changes in organisational functioning is part of the register’s design goal.  The inclusion of these 
capabilities is well supported in the relevant literature (Kash & Darling, 1998). 
 
Particular attention during the implementation of the framework focussed on ensuring information 
flow(s) to the governance committees and from them to senior executives.  The combination of specialists 
(in the legally mandated committees) and generalists guided by specialist risk professionals in the CRMC is 
designed to address the ‘Law of Requisite Variety’ described above.  By designing the team and its 
functional processes to match organisational complexity, it is hoped that unexpected surprises could be 
minimised and that information and advice on corporate governance matters would flow smoothly and in a 
timely manner to the highest levels of the organisation.    
 
Clarke (1993) raises important points about how data becomes information in large and complex 
organizations especially when crisis approaches:    
 
The process here concerns how data are turned into information.  Modernity, and its increasingly 
complex socio-technical systems, are inundated with raw data, about o-rings, nuclear designs, 
occupational hazards, and so forth.  How those data are organized and made sense of determine 
whether they become relevant information or are dismissed as background noise.  It would be 




How might recognition and use of such combinations of Corporate Governance and Risk 
Management capacities be promoted domestically and internationally?  Mendonça, (2004) suggests that in 
certain circumstances ‘weak signals’ might be discernable that are not necessarily inimical to an 
organisation but might be the harbingers of novelty and innovation.  The organisational capacities to 
discern opportunity and threat are similar and access to an organisational repertoire that allows both 
outcomes would be a much sought after benefit.  Such capacities, however, require committed and 
sustained investment in human resources and organisational flexibility.  It is only through such 
commitment that effective corporate governance outcomes may be achieved.          
 
A commitment to a sustained ability to examine organisational vulnerability can be unfashionable 
because corporate governance and crisis reform is essentially cyclical.  Corporate governance reform and 
increased regulation is generally more active during periods of recession, corporate collapse and re-
examination of the viability of regulatory systems (Clarke, 2004).  Support and active interest in the 
conformance aspects of governance diminishes during periods of expansion as companies and shareholders 
become again more concerned with the generation of wealth.   
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This paper has argued that failures are a normal and expected aspect of large interactively complex 
organisations.  It has also suggested that when organizations learn from errors and crises there is a tendency 
towards forgetful-ness, ambiguity and uncertainty over time.  Aspects of these conditions have been teased-
out by brief examinations of the three empirically grounded conceptual themes from crisis and risk 
management literature.    
 
Crisis management is effectively a shorthand for management practices subsumed into 
institutional and organisational responses to non-routine events.  Rhinard, Ekengren, & Boin (2004) 
suggest that specific challenges can be categorised under four headings: Prevention - recognition systems 
for emerging crises; Preparation - planning for the unknown; Response - making effective decisions and 
having them implemented; and, Recovery - restoring normality and learning.  However, both preventing 
and preparing for crisis-situations presumes a deep and effective understanding of the way in which 
‘unknown’ factors and conditions can manifest.  Understanding further presumes a means to do this that 
allows sense to be made of confusing circumstances.  Equally important is the capacity to effectively 
generate an organisational response in crisis situations.   
 
Complacency concerning corporate governance and risk management during uneventful times 
compounds the impacts of crises when they occur.  Such factors are universal in market systems and in 
socio-technical settings but because of differences between international systems of governance the 
unwinding of this saga have occurred at varying times, for different reasons, and with different primary and 
secondary consequences (Clarke, 2004).  
 
Finally, Mason (2004) details excerpts from findings of the Commission of Inquiry into the loss of 
the space shuttle Challenger that state: “Thiokol Management reversed its position and recommended the 
launch of [Challenger], … contrary to the views of its engineers in order to accommodate a major 
customer."  The Commission report further states that “NASA appeared to be requiring a contractor to 
prove that it was not safe to launch, rather than proving it was safe."  Arguably this disaster was destined to 
occur because the ‘institution’ behind the space shuttle had lost its capacity for high reliability, failed to 
sense the vulnerable state decision-making processes had created, and had become crisis prone.  In this 
sense it was an orgnaisational failure that probably could not have been prevented before it occurred. 
   
 
LIMITATIONS OF THE PAPER AND FUTURE DIRECTONS 
 
This paper bases its arguments and comments on established conceptual frameworks grounded in empirical 
research.  It is by design theoretical and analytical but does identify clear directions for further 
investigation.     While the Framework shown in Figure 2 is currently functional in a large and complex 
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public sector organisation there is a need to assess more formally the viability of its basic design and 
conceptual foundations.  This includes how well its conceptual basis and design parameters match different 
operating environments and settings in public and private organisations internationally.      
 
Examination of the application of ‘the law of requisite variety’ in the preparation of corporate threat 
assessment teams as well as the usefulness of separating formal internal control processes from anticipatory 
corporate risk functions would also be timely.  This latter question is important for enhancing corporate 
governance and minimising organisational vulnerability and failure in domestic and international firms 
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